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State Control of Political Thought *
The years since the World War have brought forth a host of legislation
directed toward the suppression of political thought and utterance deemed
dangerous to the body politic. Interestingly enough, most of the state
legislation directed toward this end was enacted in the year following the
war. The legislative mind, exercised by the Russian Revolution abroad and
the sentiment of unrest which followed the war at home, thought it wise to
discourage the advocacy of revolt and sabotage by visiting heavy penalties
upon the offenders. Even the outward symbol of revolt, the red flag, was
condemned, so that its display as a sign of sympathy with radical activity
is now punishable in all but sixteen of the United States.1
Unlike some legislation passed in a welter of enthusiasm for the end
sought and then buried in the books, prosecutions have been fairly prolific.
A cursory glance at the digests reveals that California is far and away the
most vigilant in the prosecution of the radical offender, and in general the
West has led the East in the number of prosecutions. For a time after 1925,
legislative and prosecutorial activity directed toward this end became exceed-
ingly small. However, with the advent of the business depression and the
consequent awakening of radical movements, the last few years have seen
new enactments designed to curb the spread of radical thought. This note
will concern itself with some of the problems raised by legislation of this
nature.
A general impression that radical ideas were being advanced in some of
the schools and colleges, combined with a feeling that susceptible youth should
not be exposed to radical thought, has led to the passage of what may be
called Teacher's Loyalty Oath Bills.2 This type of bill is currently extremely
* A discussion of federal sedition legislation is to be found in Note (1935) 35 COL. L.
REv. 917.
I. ALA. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1928) §§4104-6; ARIZ. Rav. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer,
1928) § 4875; ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 2319; CAL. PENAL CODE (Deer-
ing, 1931) § 403a [Ist section held unconstitutional in Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359
(1931)] ; CoLo. STAT. ANN. (Courtright's Mills, 1930) §§ I893k-n; CONN. GEN. STAT. (Rev.
1930) § 6o41; Del. Laws 1919, c. 231; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) § 17-4609; ILL. REv. STAT.
(Cahill, 1933) c. 38, §§ 592-3; IND. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin, 1934) §§ 2399, 2401; IOWA CODE
(1931) §§ 12901-3; KAN. REv. STAT. ANN. (1923) §§ 21-1305-6; MIcH. Comep. LAws (1929)
§§ 16561-2; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §§ 10510-13; MONT. REV. CODE (Choate, 1921)
§§ 10745-6; NEB. Compr. STAT. (1929) §§ 28-1104 to 28-1107; N. J. Co P. STAT. (Cum. Supp.
1911-1924) § 52-51; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) § 35-3302; N. Y. PENAL LAW
(Supp. 1935) § 2095-a [held unconstitutional in People v. Altman, 241 App. Div. 858, :8o
N. Y. Supp. 248 (Ist Dep't 1934) on authority of Stromberg v. California, supra]; N. D.
Comlp. LAws ANN. (Supp. 1913-1925) §§ 979oai-3; OHIO CODE ANN. (Baldwin's Throck-
morton, 1934) §§ 12398-1-2; OKLA. STAT. (Harlow, 1931) §2575; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930)
§ 14-8, 126; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 18, §§ 63-4; R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923) C. 393,
§ I; S. D. ComP. LAWS (1929) §§ 435I-B-C; UTAH REV. STAT. ANN. (1933) § 103-26-84;
Vt. Laws 1919, c. 195; WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1931) §§2563-7 to 2563-1o;
W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) §§ 5913-4; Wis. STAT. (1931) § 348.485.
2. That the purpose of this legislation is to curb the spread of radical thought in the
schools, see Burdette, Progress of Teachers' Oath (Nov. 1935) NATIONAL REPUBLIC 20 at
32, where the author says: "The public has become increasingly aware and alarmed of dan-
gerous attacks, both open and clandestine, upon the Constitution and the communistic theories
that have crept into many educational institutions."
(390)
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popular with legislatures. Within the last year Arizona,3 Georgia,4 Massa-
chusetts,5 Michigan," New Jersey,7 Texas 8 and Vermont 9 have enacted such
statutes. With minor variations, they provide that it shall be unlawful to
serve as a teacher in any educational institution unless an oath is taken to
support and defend the Constitution of the United States and the constitu-
tion of the particular state. Refusal to take the oath is visited with diverse
consequences in the various states. Generally such a teacher must be denied
employment. 10 In other states, fine or imprisonment is provided for teach-
ing without taking the oath; 11 sometimes those in charge of the institution
are to be fined for permitting one who has not taken the oath to teach.
12
Finally, some states provide no specific penalty at all, 13 merely declaring it
unlawful to teach without taking the oath.
At least one teacher has seen the possibility of such laws becoming an
entering wedge in a future effort to restrict freedom of academic discussion.14
3. Ariz. Sess. Laws 1935, c. 67. The act applies only to teachers in public schools.
4. Ga. Laws 1935, Res. 54. This act applies only to public school teachers and states in
the "whereas" clause that Georgia "is being flooded with propaganda." In addition to re-
quiring the oath, the teachers are obliged "to refrain from directly or indirectly subscribing
to or teaching any theory of government or economics or of social relations which is incon-
sistent with the fundamental principles of patriotism and high ideals of Americanism." The
penalty is discharge. In the light of Stromberg v. Caljfornia, 283 U. S. 359 (i93i), dis-
cussed infra p. 397, this statute is probably unconstitutional in that it might be construed to
forbid the advocacy of governmental change by peaceful means.
5. See N. Y. Times, June 27; 1935, at 44. The only ones exempted from the requirement
are foreign exchange professors.
6. Mich. Public & Local Acts 1935, No. 23. This act applies to teachers in schools
"whose property, or any part thereof, is exempt from taxation." A school which employs
teachers who refuse to take the oath forfeits its tax exemption; a school supported by public
funds will be refused state money. The statute refers only to teachers in junior colleges,
colleges and universities, and supplements MIcH. CoMP. LAws (Mason, Supp. 1933)
§§ 7381-1, 762o-I, which applies only to educational institutions supported in part or in whole
by the state, and specifically excepts the University of Michigan and the Michigan State Col-
lege of Agriculture and Applied Science.
7. N. J. Laws 1935, c. 155. Applying to teachers in schools supported in whole or in
part by public funds, the act demands from citizens or subjects of foreign countries teaching
in the schools an oath to support the institutions of the United States during the period of
employment.
8. Tex. Laws 1935, c. 330. This act requires no oath, but each applicant for a certificate
to teach in the public free schools must satisfy the county superintendent that he will support
and defend the constitutions of the United States and Texas.
9. Vt. Laws 1935, No. 88. This act applies to public schools, and to private schools
which furnish an equivalent education. The oath is not required from foreign citizens, but
such persons are prohibited from teaching subversive propaganda and must promote ethical
character, good citizenship and patriotic loyalty to the United States.
io. E. g., IND. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin, 1934) § 598o; N. D. Laws 1931, c. 255; WASH.
Ray. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1931) § 4966-1.
i. E. g., OKL_.A. STAT. (Harlow, i93I) § 6815.
12. E. g., ORF_. CODE ANN. (930) § 35-2404.
13. E. g., N. Y. ED. LAw (Supp. 1935) § 709. This statute also makes it "unlawful" for
one having charge of an educational institution to permit one who has not taken the oath to
teach. Perhaps the most comprehensive sanctions for teaching without taking the oath exist
in West Virginia. See W. VA. CoDa ANN. (Michie, 1932) § i8o7, to the effect that if one
teaches without taking the oath, his pay check may not be honored, and the issuer of the
check is guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine.
14. Professor Mather, of Harvard University, contended that the requirement of the
oath from private school teachers was unconstitutional, and announced his refusal to take it.
See N. Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1935, at i. He capitulated when Dr. James B. Conant, president of
Harvard University, ruled that the entire faculty must obey the law. See (Oct. 12, 1935)
LiTERARY DIGEST 39. The oaths have also figured in the news in connection with the ruling
of Comptroller General McCarl that no checks would be issued to those who refused to com-
ply with his order that all teachers in the District of Columbia take such an oath.
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The mooted point whether such an oath stands in the way of pointing out
to students the existence of radical dogmas, or merely doses the door to
advocating these doctrines in the classroom, has not been passed on. It would
seem, however, that there is nothing inconsistent in exposing students to the
fact of radical thought, at the same time that one has sworn to support and
defend the Constitution. Any other interpretation would be an absurd
attempt to combat ideas by ignoring them.
One final observation: it must be kept in mind that all disloyal teachers
will not be removed from the schools by the passage of such a statute. The
pledge means no more or no less than the significance which the individual
teacher attaches to the oath; if this significance is small, the statute as to
him is nugatory and he will continue to teach the forbidden doctrines until
he is stopped by such effective means as are provided in the statute.
To date, fourteen states have such a statute.15 The acts express, at
the least, the legislative belief that other sanctions must be added to the
already existing social pressure which demands that teachers conform to the
accepted ideals of thought and conduct in the community.
In contrast to the foregoing type of legislation, which achieves its end
by indirection, are found the more common though less current "sedition"
statutes which make it criminal for anyone to advocate radical theories and
practices. These statutes subdivide into (I) criminal syndicalism, (2) crim-
inal anarchy and (3) sedition statutes, properly speaking. Criminal syndi-
calism, as defined in the realm of political theory, is a political and industrial
movement which demands that the means of production, distribution and
government shall be turned over to all those workers who are actively useful
in the community.' 6 A typical statute, containing a more lurid definition,
follows:/7
"Criminal syndicalism is the doctrine which advocates crime, sabo-
tage, violence, or other unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of
accomplishing industrial or political reform. The advocacy of such
doctrine, whether by word of mouth or writing is a felony . .. ."
This doctrine of syndicalism finds its chief exponent in the "Industrial
Workers of the World", whose activities are confined almost exclusively to
the western part of the United States; 18 of the seventeen states where the
acivocacy of the doctrine is officially condemned, 19 thirteen are west of the
15. Statutes of this type which have not been enumerated supra are: CAL. GEN. LAws
(Deering, 1931) Act 7519, § 5.128; CoLO. STAT. ANN. (Courtright's Mills, 193o) §§ 6767j-1;
Mont. Laws 1931, c. ig; NEv. Comp. LAws (Hillyer, 1929) § 5686; S. D. Comp. LAws
(1929) §§ 7518-A-C. A statute in Vermont prohibits teachers from indulging in propaganda
subversive of the constitutions of the United States or Vermont. Vt. Laws 1931, c. 22. In
Florida and South Carolina, teachers must satisfy the examiners of their loyalty to the
national Constitution. FLA. COmP. GEN. LAWS (1927) § 618; S. C. CODE (1932) § 5342 (3).
Oaths are required in District of Columbia, Guam, Panama Canal Zone, and the Philippine
and Virgin Islands. See Burdette, Progress of Teachers' Oath (Nov. 1935) NATIONAL
REPUBLIC 20.
16. 26 ENcYC. Am. (1925) 171. For both a more extensive definition and the history of
this worldwide movement, see 21 ENcYc. BRIT. (I4th ed. 1929) 706.
17. IOWA CODE (1931) § 12906.
18. See 12 ENcyc. BRiT. (I4th ed. 1929) 310; OAKES, ORGANIZED LABOR AND INDUS-
TRIAL CONFLICTS (1927) i6o et seq.
ig. CAl. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1931) Act 8428, §§ I, a; CoLO. STAT. ANN. (Court-
right's Mills, 193o) §§ I893a-e; CONN. GEN. STAT. (Rev. 193o) § 6o72; IDAHO CODE ANN.
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Mississippi River. That the statutes were aimed at this organization is
borne out by an investigation of the cases arising under the statute.2 ° Ad-
vocacy of the doctrines of the Communist party has also been held to be
within the condemnation of this type of statute.
21
The criminal anarchy statutes follow generally the original New York
statute 22 which was passed soon after the assassination of President Mc-
Kinley.23  The following is a typical statute : 24
"Criminal anarchy is the doctrine that organized government
should be overthrown by force or violence, or by assassination of the
executive head or of the executive officials of government, or by any
unlawful means. The advocating of such doctrine either by word of
mouth or writing is a felony."
This is law in ten states.
2 5
Sedition statutes proper fail to reveal the same uniformity in wording.
However, Michigan's new statute is a fair representative: 26
"Any person who advocates . . . the overthrow by force or vio-
lence of the government of the United States and/or of any state of the
United States is guilty of a felony."
Twenty other jurisdictions have such a statute.27
(1932) §§ 17-4401 to 17-4404; IOWA CODE (1931) §§ 12906-9; KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923)
§§21-301 to 21-304; Ky. STAT. ANN. (Carroll, Baldwin Rev. 1930) §§ 1148a-I, I48a-3 to
1148a-I4; MicH. ComPl. LAWS (1929) §§ 16559-6o; MONT. REV. CODE (Choate, 1921)
§§ 1o74o-4; NEV. Comn'. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) §§ 10560-3; OHIO CODE (Baldwin's Throck-
morton, 1934) §§ 13421-23 to 13421-26; OxiA. STAT. (Harlow, 1931) §§ 2571-4; ORE. CODE
ANN. (1930) § 14-3, 110 to 14-3, 113; S. D. ComP. LAWS (1929) §§3644-7; UTAH REv.
STAT. ANN. (I933) §§ 103-54-1 to 103-54-5; WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1931)
§§ 2563-1 to 2563-5; W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) § 5912.
20. While the prosecutions for advocacy of the doctrines of the Industrial Workers of
the World have been general throughout the west [e. g., Burns v. United States, 274 U. S.
328 (1927); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380 (1927) ; State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 191 N. W.
530 (1923); State v. Lowery, lO4 Wash. 520, 177 Pac. 355 (1918) (prosecution under crim-
inal anarchy statute)], the California reports show about as many prosecutions for I. W.
W. activity as the rest of the western states combined. E. g., People v. Roe, 58 Cal. App.
690, 2o9 Pac. 381 (1922) ; People v. LaRue, 62 Cal. App. 276, 216 Pac. 627 (1923) ; People
v. Wagner, 65 Cal. App. 704, 225 Pac. 464 (924) ; People v. Stewart, 68 Cal. App. 621, 230
Pac. 221 (1924) ; People v. Powell, 71 Cal. App. 500, 236 Pac. 311 (1925).
21. People v. Ruthenberg, 229 Mich. 315, 2O N. W. 358 (1924) ; State v. Boloff, 138
Ore. 568, 7 P. (2d) 775 (1932).
22. N. Y. PENAL LAW (igi6) §§ 160-6.
23. For an illuminating discussion of the history of these acts see CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF
SPEECH (1920) 187 et seq.
24. ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) § 3208.
25. Id. §§ 3208-I; ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) §§ 2318-9; COLO. STAT.
ANN. (Courtrights Mills, 1930) §§ 1893a-g; MASS. Gm. LAWS (1932) c. 264, § Ii; N. J.
COMP. STAT. (Ig91) 1744, §§ 5a-f; N. Y. PENAL LAW (1916) §§ 16o-6; R. I. GEN. LAWS
(1923) c. 393, § 2; Vt. Laws 1919, c. 194; WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1931)
§§ 2562, 2563 to 2563-5; WIS. STAT. (93) §§ 347-15 to 347.18.
26. Mich. Public & Local Acts 1935, No. 168.
27. CoLO. STAT. ANN. (Courtright's Mills, 193o) §§ 1893a-g; CONN. GEN. STAT. (Rev.
1930) §§ 6o39-4o; Del. Laws 1931, c. 268; FLA. COmP. LAWS ANN. (Skillman, 1927) § 7133
(passed in 1866, it prohibits attempts at insurrection as well as sedition) ; ILL. REv. STAT.
(Cahill, 1933) c. 38, f§ 587-93; IND. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin, 1934) §§ 240D-1; IOWA CODE
(193) §§ 12900-5; Ky. STAT. ANN. (Carroll, Baldwin Rev. 193o) §§ 1148a-2 to 1148a-14;
LA. CODE Cam. PROC. ANN. (Dart, 1932) §§ 1185-7; MAss. GEN. LAWS (1932) C. 264, § II;
Miss. ANN. CODE (1930) § 1162; MONT. REV. CODE (Choate, 1921) §§ 10737-9; N. H. Pub-
lic Laws 1926, c. 394, § 26; N. J. Comp. STAT. (Cum. Supp. 1911-1924) §§ 52-Ia-c; N. M.
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A general provision in almost all of .the three foregoing types of statute
makes it criminal to join any society, or voluntarily to assemble with any
group teaching or advocating the proscribed doctrines. As a further meas-
ure, the owner or person in charge of any building who knowingly permits it
to be used for the purposes mentioned is also punishable, generally with a
lighter penalty.
The third and surprisingly enough, the most common type of legislation,
is the "red flag" statute. These exist in all but sixteen of the United States.28
They read substantially as follows:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to have in his possession or
to display any red or black flag, or to display any other flag, emblem,
device or sign of any nature whatever, indicating sympathy with or
support of ideals, institutions or forms of government, hostile, inimical
or antagonistic to the form or spirit of the Constitution, laws, ideals and
institutions of this State or of the United States." 29
The last and most direct legislative efforts are completely new phenom-
ena in legislation of this type. They have been described as "Ballot Bills"
and provide that no political party that advocates the overthrow by force
or violence or that carries on a program of sedition or treason toward local,
state or national government shall be recognized or given a place on the
ballot. Within the year, Arkansas,30 Delaware,3 1 Indiana,32 and Tennes-
see 33 have enacted such statutes.
While the theory of democratic elections makes it legitimate to refuse
to recognize a party whose doctrines are opposed to peaceful change, it is
difficult to see what affirmative evil exists in the presence of such parties
on the ballot. It is well known that this type of party is rarely a factor in
any given election.
The Common Law
The only case which could be found affirmatively indicating without the
assistance of a statute, that utterance of seditious words was punishable, is
Respublica v. Dennie.34  This was a case at nisi prius in which the defendant
was indicted for publishing, shortly after the foundation of the Republic:
"A democracy is scarcely tolerable at any period of national history....
No wise man but discerns its imperfections, no good man but shudders at
its miseries, no honest man but proclaims its fraud and no brave man but
draws his sword against its force." "
STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) §§ 35-3101 to 35-3105 [unconstitutional; see State v. Dia-
mond, 27 N. M. 477, 202 Pac. 988 (I92I)] ; OxIA. STAT. (Harlow, 193I) §2573; PA. STAT.
ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 18, §§ 121-2; R. I. GEN. LAws (1923) c. 393, §I; TENN. CODE
ANN. (Michie, 1932) § II26; WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1931) §§ 2563-I to
2563-5.
28. See supra note i.
29.W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) § 5913.
3o. Ark. Acts I935, Act 33.
31. Del. Laws I935, c. 144.
32. Ind. Acts 1935, c. 325. The act goes so far as to require any political party which
has been previously awarded a place on the ballot to insert a plank in its platform stating
that it does not advocate the overthrow of local, state or national government by force or
violence, nor carry on a program of sedition or treason.
33. Tenn. Public Acts 1935, c. 72.
34. 4 Yeates 267 (Pa. 18o5).
35. Id. at 268. The defendant was found not guilty.
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The jury was charged that if "the publication was seditiously, ma-
liciously, and wilfully aimed at the independence of the United States, or
the constitution thereof or of this state," they should convict; but if it "was
honestly meant to inform the public mind, and warn them against supposed
dangers in society", 36 they should acquit. It is quite plain that the judge
had carried over some of the English experience with seditious words. 37
The very important controversy over the Alien and Sedition Acts,38 which
took place at the inception of the Union of the States, demonstrates how
greatly the experience of the founding fathers with English Star Chambers
contributed to their feeling against the suppression of adverse political com-
ment. It is perhaps for this reason that more cases are not to be found
asserting that there is a common law of sedition.
Constitutionality
That the guarantee of free speech in the First Amendment does not
affect state legislation is well established, since the first ten amendments
apply only to Congressional legislation.39 However, the due process clause
in the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects so many other rights, has
been invoked by the Supreme Court to the effect that an unreasonable re-
striction of free speech is a deprivation of "liberty" 40 and that free speech
is a "fundamental" right.
41
When the right of free speech is alleged to have been deprived by Con-
gressional legislation, the Supreme Court has said that it is legally justified
only when the words used are sufficiently dangerous. 42  But where a state
statute is under attack as a deprivation of liberty under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court has seen fit to lay down a different rule.
The condemnation by a legislature of the utterance of a particular type of
36. Id. at 271.
37. See, for example, the case of The King v. Cobbett, reported in HOLT, LmEL (2d ed.
1816) 114, n. it. There the publisher of the "Weekly Register" printed in the form of a let-
ter, of which he was not the author, a libel on the administration of the Irish government.
Lord Ellenborough charged the jury: "It is no new doctrine, that if a publication be calcu-
lated to alienate the affections of the people, by bringing the government into disesteem,
whether the expedient be by ridicule or obloquy, the person so conducting himself is exposed
to the inflictions of the law."
38. 4 CHANNiNG, HisToy OF THE UNITED STATES (1917) 220 et seq.; 2 McMAsTrx,
HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES (1887) 393 et seq.
39. See Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U. S. 1833) ; Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410 (U. S.
1847) ; Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71 (U. S. 1855).
4o. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925); Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357
(927) ; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380 (I927). Two cases affirmatively holding a statute
unconstitutional for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment as being an unreasonable re-
striction of liberty are Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931), and the recent case of
People v. Altman, 241 App. Div. 858, 28o N. Y. Supp. 248 (Ist Dep't 1934),, in which the
court in a memorandum opinion based its decision on Stromberg v. California, supra.
41. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 666 (1925).
42. The test used with regard to Congressional legislation, where the First Amendment
definitely limits restrictions on freedom of speech, is usually phrased in the classic words of
Mr. Justice Holmes. The words must be "used in such circumstances and [be] of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent." Schenk v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52 (191o). See
also, with regard to the test, Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616 (1919) and Debs v.
United States, 249 U. S. 211 (ii) , which have, perhaps, relaxed the forcefulness of the
limitation laid down by Mr. Justice Holmes. In any event, as Mr. Justice Brandeis has
stated, there is yet no fixed standard "by which to determine when a danger shall be deemed
clear." Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 374 (927). See Note (1927) 76 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 198, 200 et seq.
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language is said to be a finding of danger sufficient to preclude further
investigation by the Court.
43
On the other hand, both the Supreme Court 44 and two state courts 45
have struck down statutes as unwarranted restrictions of free speech when
they could be construed to prohibit the advocacy of political change by peace-
ful means.
Objections to the statutes based on unconstitutionality for other reasons
than a restriction of freedom of speech have been many. Counsel often
object that the statute is so broadly worded that no ascertainable standard
of guilt is fixed; 4 and therefore amounts to a legislative delegation to the
court and jury of the business of defining offenses. 47  These objections are
regularly brushed aside on the grounds that the words are sufficiently explicit
and have such commonly understood significance that the citizenry are
sufficiently warned of what is made criminal; and that the standards of
criminal conduct are sufficiently laid down so that court and jury may proceed
without enjoying any unbounded discretion as to the definition of the offenses.
Resort to the dictionary is usually had to show the precise meaning of these
terms.
A peculiar constitutional question is presented by the Pennsylvania
Constitution which in Article I, Section 2 states that the people have the
"inalienable right to alter, reform or abolish their government in such
manner as they may think proper." When this provision was urged against
the constitutionality of the minutely detailed and stringent Sedition Act
of Pennsylvania, 48 it was answered by the court that the "right of self-
protection is an attribute of government", 49 and later, that the Civil War
demonstrated that the constitutional guarantee of free choice of courses of
action was by no means unlimited, and finally, that the police power must
perforce override the constitutional mandate.50
In general, objections raised on the basis of deprivation of liberty with-
out due process of law clauses in state constitutions have been exorcised by
calling on the police power of the state. The basis of this is the broad and
vaguely outlined syllogism that if the state has the right to protect the
health, safety and morals of its citizens, a fortiori, it has the right to protect
the existence of the state itself. The only problem is how far removed from
the prohibition of actual insurrection a state may go in preserving itself.
For example, the Connecticut statute prohibits the publication of disloyal,
scurrilous or abusive matter concerning the form of government of the
United States, its military forces, flag or uniform; any matter intended
to bring the United States into contempt; any matter which creates or
43. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 668 (1925); Whitney v. California, 274 U.
S. 357, 371 (1927) ; dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Cardozo in Herndon v. Georgia, 295
U. S. 441, 447 et seq. (1935), 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 256.
44. Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (931).
45. State v. Gabriel, 95 N. J. L. 337, 112 Atl. 611 (Sup. Ct. 1921) ; State v. Diamond, 27
N. M. 477, 202 Pac. 988 (I92I).
46. See People v. Ruthenberg, 229 Mich. 315, 324-26, 2O N. W. 358, 36o-i (1925);
State v. Worker's Socialist Publishing Co., 15o Minn. 4o6, 407-8, 185 N. W. 931, 932 (1921).
47. E. g., State v. Sinchuk, 96 Conn. 6o5, 607, 115 Atl. 33, 34 (92).
48. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 18, § 121.
49. See Commonwealth v. Blankenstein, 81 Pa. Super. 340, 342 (1923).
50. Commonwealth v. Widovich, 295 Pa. 311, 317, 145 Atl. 295, 297 (1929) ; see Com-
monwealth v. Lazar, lO3 Pa. Super. 417, 422, 424, 157 Atl. 701, 703 (931).
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fosters opposition to organized government. 5 1 It is clear under the doc-
trine mentioned above (that advocacy of peaceful change of government may
not be interdicted) that the last clause is unconstitutional. 2  The very phrase
"opposition to organized government" has been held by the United States
Supreme Court, construing a California statute, to encompass advocacy
by a minority party of the ousting of the incumbent political party.53  The
line demarcating the limits of the police power falls somewhere between
this constitutional limitation and the prohibition of actual insurrection.
On the basis of the treatment given by the courts when an issue of free
speech is made under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is fair to assume that
the Loyalty Oath Bills will be held constitutional. It seems clear under the
cases that such a requirement is well within the police power of the state
as a regulation of the "morals" of the young. This conclusion is re-enforced
since most teachers are citizens; it need only be pointed out that there exists
such a relationship between citizen and state which, at the extremes, will com-
pel the citizen to bear arms in defense of his country.54. It cannot be an arbi-
trary exercise of the police power to compel the citizen to swear an oath
that he will support and defend the Constitution of the very country he is
obliged to fight for. The fact that public schools are supported by public
funds and that the teacher is by that much a public servant, bolsters an al-
ready overpowering case for constitutionality. The extreme case would be
that of an alien teaching in a private school who was compelled to take the
oath. But the holdings of the courts to the effect that restrictions laid on
aliens as a condition of employment in a "quasi-public" occupation are con-
stitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, would seem to control even
such a case.5
As to the so-called "Ballot Bills", it can only be repeated that no one
may object to the exclusion of a radical party from the ballot on the ground
of restriction of freedom of speech, as the law now stands. It seems clear
that if, under the Constitution, one may be punished for the advocacy of cer-
tain doctrines, no one may object that a party standing for those doctrines
is being deprived of a place on the ballot.
Miscellaneous Considerations
The definition of the word "sabotage", which is practically always pres-
ent in criminal syndicalism statutes, has troubled the courts in at least two
cases. It is clear that where the defendant has advocated the wrecking of
machinery, for example, no problem is presented. But in one case where the
defendant advocated striking on the job by doing the smallest amount of
work possible, it was held that such conduct was not sabotage within the
51. ColN. GEN. STAT. (Rev. 1930) § 6o39.
52. The statute was held constitutional in State v. Sinchuk, 96 Conn. 6o5, 115 Atl. 33
(I92I), ten years before the Supreme Court struck down the similar California statute in
Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (193).
53. Id. at 369.
54. U. S. CoxsT. Art. I, § 8. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 (1918) ; see
United States v. Maclntosh, 283 U. S. 605, 623-5 (1931) ; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U. S. IT, 29 (19o).
55. See Note (934) 83 U. or PA. L. REv. 74, 77. It is interesting to note that Governor
Lehman of New York vetoed the bill when presented to him for the first time on the ground
that private school teachers would be affected. N. Y. Times, May 17, 1934, at 4.
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statute.56 On the other hand, where a jury was charged that the advocacy
of "scamped work" would be within the statute, the United States Supreme
Court affirmed the charge.5 7 It was thought necessary, however, to bol-
ster the decision by investigating the offered evidence, which clearly showed
advocacy of more than merely "scamped work".
A practical problem in the law of evidence is presented in almost all the
cases. Once it is shown that the defendant is a member of an organization
alleged to have been guilty of the advocacy of violence, it does not avail him
to protest that the statements made at authorized meetings and writings
showing the purposes of the organization are not admissible against him.
5 8
This sort of evidence is held admissible under the familiar head of declara-
tions of co-conspirators engaged in the furtherance of an unlawful pur-
pose.59 This represents probably the furthest extension of the rule, since the
number of conspirators who may make admissible statements becomes very
large in a radical organization of any size. Furthermore, it is probable that
internal factions therein may disagree with the tactics acceptable to a major-
ity of the membership. It seems that enthusiasm for the extirpation of radi-
cal thought and utterance may have dulled the judicial perception of the
function of the rules of evidence.
In no case has it been thought necessary to investigate the harm resulting
from the defendant's utterances. The difficulty lies in the fact that "the
expectancy of life to be ascribed to the persuasive power of an idea" 60
can only be guessed at. However, the lack of probable danger has not both-
ered any of the state courts. The conviction is allowed to stand on the show-
ing made by pamphlets, speeches and party platforms. In State v. Moilen 61
the defendant was convicted merely on a showing that he posted stickers
on buildings reading, e. g., "Join the one big union"-"Abolition of the
Wage System"--"Join the I. W. W. for freedom"-"Beware of Sabotage".
The unsubstantial social harm resulting from activity of this sort would not
seem to warrant the stigma of conviction for a felony plus the more effective
sanction of imprisonment and fine.
CONCLUSION
The concept of state carries with it the right to punish those who would
overthrow it. But the nature of the democratic state is such that encroach-
ment by statute on the free expression of ideas, though aimed at revolution-
ary movement, inevitably discourages those who would peacefully reform.
Militancy of language should not thus be allowed to be confused with
advocacy of violence. If one believes with Mr. Justice Holmes that "the
56. In re Moore, 38 Idaho 506, 224 Pac. 662 (924).
57. Burns v. United States, 274 U. S. 328 (927). The evidence showed advocacy of
loading ships so as to cause them to list unnecessarily, compelling the ship to put into port
again, thereby reducing the employer's profits. Brandeis, J., dissented, on the ground that
the charge was faulty and that it went clearly beyond the meaning of sabotage in the statute.
The act involved was CM.. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931) Act 8428, §§ i, 2.
58. E. g., State v. Boloff, 138 Ore. 568, 7 P. (2d) 775 (1932). The defendant was a
member of the Communist Party. In the prosecution under the criminal syndicalism statute,
it was held that statements made at party meetings were admissible.
59. See State v. Lowery, io4 Wash. 520, 525, 177 Pac. 355, 357 (918) (inflammatory
pamphlets published by I. W. W. held admissible).
6o. Cardozo, J., in Hemdon v. Georgia, 295 U. S. 44, 454 (935).
6i. i4o Minn. 112, 167 N. W. 345 (i918).
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best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market," 62 and that the American way of life has been to
allow even the most inflammatory words to circulate freely, these statutes
are not a legitimate exercise of the police power but an unwarranted stifling
of freedom of expression. That the beliefs and emotions of the majority
must be embodied in statutes punishing the expression of ideas inimical to
the existence of the status quo is an admission by that much that democracy
has failed. Faith in democracy would allow all dangerous political ideas to
reach the eyes and ears of all, trusting in their repudiation by the ultimate
governing body, the electorate.
A.G.V.
62. Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (I919).
